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circumstances would yield a result which is consonant with the purpose
of the clause.83
Until this judicial status can be reached, the combination of a case-
by-case determination 4 and the power of the House to take action
against its members8 5 would act as a deterrent against abuse of the
privilege. In this way independence of the legislature is insured, and
the Members can effectively perform their constitutional duty.
Louis Leo Brunetti
FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C., SECTION 1343(3)-
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that for purposes of
federal jurisdiction arising under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, and its juris-
dictional correlate 28 U.S.C., section 1343(3), there is no difference in
achieving the right to redress deprivation pursuant to section 1343(3),
whether the right asserted is personal, or proprietary.
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
Mrs. Lynch directed her employer to deposit ten dollars of her weekly
pay in a credit union savings account in 1968. Shortly thereafter, House-
hold Finance brought an action in a Connecticut state court, alleging
non-payment of a promissory note in the amount of five hundred twenty-
five dollars. Prior to Mrs. Lynch's being served with process, Household
Finance garnished the savings account set up by! her employer.1 Mrs.
Lynch then proceeded to file a class action in federal district court
against both the sheriffs who levied on the savings account, and House-
hold Finance which invoked the prejudgment garnishment procedure.2
In that action, the plaintiff alleged violation of due process and equal
83. See Cella, supra note 18.
84. Mr. Justice Stewart stated that this type of determination would balance the need
for an informed public with the proper administration of justice. 408 U.S. at 632.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
1. Household Finance Corp. garnished the savings account pursuant to CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 52-329 (1961), which authorizes summary prejudgment attachment, and gar-
nishment. Under the statute, this action could be taken at the request of attorneys for the
creditor.
2. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970). In this action,
a class action was used to represent those owners of savings and checking accounts who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief after having had their accounts garnished under
the Connecticut procedure.
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protection, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to
section 1983,8 and its jurisdictional counterpartsection 1:343(3).4 A dis-
trict, court of three judges convened to hear, the claim, but the court
never had an opportunity to reach a decision on the merits. of the case,
as the complaint was dismissed on grounds, inter alia, that the district
court lacked jurisdiction under section 1343(3).6 The district court
stated that section 1343(3)applied only to personal liberties as opposed
to the proprietary rights Mrs. Lynch seemed to be asserting. The Su-
preme Court of the- United States proceeded to note probable jurisdic-
tion to determine the jurisdictional question of 1343(3). 7 In rejecting
the district court's determination of the inapplicability of section
1343(3) to proprietary rights, the Supreme Court clarified 1343(3) by
saying that for the purpose of achieving a federal forum through
1343(3), there is no difference whether the claim is essentially personal
or proprietary.8
.Prior to Lynch, section 1343(3) was the subject of much judicial
scrutiny. This jurisdictional section was originally enacted in conjunc-
tion with the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 9 and provided a cause of action
to redress deprivations arising under color of state law, of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. The first problem
with the section was to determine exactly what rights, privileges, and
immunities were secured for redress. Early cases, such as the companion
cases Carter v. Greenhow' and Pleasants v. Greenhow1 attempted
unsuccessfully to define the scope of the right secured. Cases followed
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or any person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides:
The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person ...
(3) to redress the deprivation, arising under any state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
5. A three judge federal court may be convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970)
from which a direct appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court.
6. 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
7. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 401 U.S. 935 (1971).
8. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
9. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The full title of the act was an "Act to
enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and for other Purposes."
10. 114 U.S. 317 (1884).
11. 114 U.S. 323 (1884).
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for nearly a thirty year period without cogently defining the rights
secured in section 1343(3).12 Not until Justice Stone's concurrence in
Hague v. CIO18 were true contraints laid on 1343(3) jurisdiction. In
Hague, there was no majority opinion, but Mr. Justice Stone's con-
currence seemed to have the greatest impact, stating;
Whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not
dependent for its existence upon the infringement of a property
right, there is jurisdiction in the district courts under section
[1343(3)] ... [without any proof] as to the amount in controversy.1 4
It was this portion of Hague which, in the years following its deci-
sion, caused so much confusion in federal courts in determining 1343(3)
jurisdiction. Cases arose in which there were clearly personal rights at
issue, and most federal courts followed Mr. Justice Stone.' 5 Yet, some
courts, believing the distinction to have little weight because no major-
ity decision was rendered in Hague, denied jurisdiction even to claims
.which were strictly personal in nature.'6
Still greater problems arose when the claim asserted was partly
personal and partly proprietary. A weighing of the personal versus pro-
prietary nature of the claim became necessary, and results in the various
circuits and districts varied widely.' 7 Still other courts felt Mr. Justice
12. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (sustained jurisdiction in an equal protec-
tion challenge to alleged employment discrimination); Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S.
68 (1900) (denied jurisdiction in an action to enjoin state taxation of patent rights alleg-
edly in violation of federal law).
13. 307 U.S. 496 (1949).
14. Id. at 531-32. It should be noted at this point that an action brought under section
1343(3) is not subject to the amount-in-controversy provision of federal jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). This was stated in the Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087,
1091. In Hague, Mr. Justice Stone reasoned to the same conclusion stating that the pre-
decessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the substantive provision accompanying section 1343(3),
was passed prior to the predecessor of section 1331; and, therefore, the Congress was pre-
sumed to have known about section 1343(3) when it passed section 1331.
15. McNamara v. Malloy, 337 F. Supp. 732 (D. Vt. 1971). This case sustained 1343(3)
jurisdiction in a claim of denial of due process in taking a drivers license without a hearing.
16. Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
17. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Murdock sustained 1343(3) juris-
diction in a plaintiff's claim of denial of freedom of religion caused by a state statute
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation. The Court did recognize the proprietary element
encompassed in door-to-door solicitation of the Jehovah Witness sect, but felt it to be
ancillary to the consideration of the personal right of freedom of religion. See also Walton
v. City of Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (sustained
1343(3) jurisdiction in a right to work claim-felt that there was some personal element
in the claim in that denial of equal protection was alleged); Battone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d
705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1949) (jurisdiction was sustained in a claim
for damages for a denial of right to trial by jury-personal right of trial by jury prevailed
over pecuniary considerations of damages).
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Stone's interpretation to be incorrect, but were hesitant to carve out
new exceptions, and therefore followed begrudgingly.'8
Even prior to Lynch, federal courts had to make determinations
about garnishment cases. Some courts adopted the strict Hague personal-
proprietary distinction, and denied jurisdiction, 19 while other federal
courts felt a Lynch-type claim to be exactly what section 1343(3) should
cover.
20
This, then, was the state of confusion that surrounded 1343(3) juris-
diction prior to the determination in Lynch.
In Lynch, the Court was faced with a parallel jurisdictional problem
encountered previously. Lynch presented within the claim aspects of
both personal and proprietary rights. In situations like this the Court
had previously denied certiorari.21 The Lynch claim was personal in
dealing with the plaintiff's right to due process of law and equal pro-
tection, yet there was the persistent fact that the claim was proprietary
in the sense of garnishing personalty of the plaintiff.
At the outset in the majority opinion, the Court stated that it had
never adopted the distinction between personal and proprietary rights
as a guide to the contours of 1343(3) jurisdiction. Hague was merely
a concurring opinion in a case which commanded no majority.22 The
Court continued by saying that it never ruled on 1343(3) jurisdiction in
post-Hague decisions when in seeming contradiction with the principle
enunciated in Hague.23
Household Finance Corporation, in support of its position that 1343(3)
applied only to personal liberties, cited three pre-Hague decisions24 and
two post-Hague affirmances 25 of federal district court dismissals of com-
plaints under section 1343(3). Household Finance claimed these cases
all held that section 1343(3) had no application if the asserted right
18. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
19. See McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
20. See Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
21. See Walton v. City of Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
823 (1950); Battone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 944(1949).
22. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
23. The Court in cases such as Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970), Walton v. City of Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 823 (1950), and Battone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 944 (1949), consistently denied certiorari.
24. Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900); Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323(1884); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1884).
25. Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Aber-
nathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 241 (1963).
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Was proprietary.26 The Court distinguished these cases by saying that all'
of them dealt with the constitutionality of given state taxes, and that
in this specialized area of taxation, the Supreme Court realizes that
Congress looks upon judicial intervention in such situations in a unique
manner, governed by unique considerations. 27 Denial of federal juris-
diction was not the result of section 1343(3) inapplicability because it
was limited to personal rights; rather, the cases were controlled by
section 1341 which prevents anticipatory adjudication in the federal
courts of such constitutional attacks on state taxes.28
The proposition that the Supreme Court never followed such a per-
sonal-property distinction and therefore is not bound by it is further
substantiated by reference to the areas of civil rights, 29 freedom of
speech,30 landlord-tenant,3' and religious discrimination,82 where there
is no showing of the application of such a distinction.
The Court, having distinguished the state taxation cases, having
shown that the personal-property distinction was never applied by the
Supreme Court and having stated that there was no majority opinion
in Hague, thus stated that as to section 1343(3) there is no difference
whether the right asserted is personal or proprietary.
In assessing the effectiveness and correctness of the Lynch decision, it
is necessary to see the reason the personal-property distinction was first
proposed by Mr. Justice Stone in Hague, and contrast it with the Lynch
Court's view of the Hague distinction.
In Hague, Mr. Justice Stone felt the need to reconcile the general
amount in controversy provision, section 1331, with the color of state
law provision for federal jurisdiction, section 1343(3).38 The Hague
26. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) states:
The District Court shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collec-
tion of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such state.
28. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U.S. 531 (1932); Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65 (1871).
29. See Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of La. St. Univ. & Agricultural & Mechanical
College, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 909 (1951) (action seeking to enjoin
an order which by its terms excluded Negroes from L.S.U., the court did not apply the
personal-property distinction).
30. City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562
(1941.) (federal court claimed jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of municipal ordinances
requiring persons selling periodicals in public to wear identification badges).
31. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
32. See MacDonald v. Shawnee Country Club, Inc., 438 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (country club attempted to exclude plaintiff because of his
religion).
33. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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concurrence can be read as an attempt to keep vitality in 1343(3) ju-
risdiction, which Mr. Justice Stone felt threatened by a possible broad
construction-of the general amount in controversy provision. The Court
reasoned that the two federal jurisdictional sections should be read
together, with neither totally excluding the other.8 4 The concurrence
stated that there are many rights"5 arising under the Constitution and
statutes, which are inherently incapable of the pecuniary evaluation of
ten thousand dollars which section 1331 seems to require, and that
surely the drafters of section 1343(3) had this in mind when section
.1343(3) was drafted. For this reason 1343(3) was meant% to apply to
personal rights, which, by their nature were inherently incapable of
pecuniary evaluation, while section 1331 was reserved for proprietary
claims capable of monetary evaluation. Therefore, the Court concluded
that section 1343(3) was not subject to the amount in controversy
provision.36
, The Lynch Court. seems to read the personal-property distinction
enunciated in Hague as restricting, rather than salvaging 1343(3) juris-
diction. The Court stated that section 1343(3) applied both to personal
and proprietary rights, thus bringing proprietary rights within the
-shelter of 1343(3) jurisdiction, and thus eliminating the need to meet
'the general amount in controversy requirement in section 1983 claims
as to property rights. This conclusion seems directly inapposite to the
attempted result of Hague, and follows the premise that Hague unduly
narrowed section 1343(3).37
The Lynch and Hague Courts therefore faced the dilemma of the
reconciliationof sections 1331, and 1343(3) from quite different per-
spectives. The Lynch view of an expanded 1343(3) jurisdiction severely
-restricts the previous bounds of the general amount in controversy
provision. The Hague rationale for the distinction was not the expan-
sion of section 1343(3) and erosion of section 1331. Rather, it was the
concurrence's aim to prevent the erosion of 1343(3) jurisdiction. Hague
viewed section 1331 as threatening the bounds of 1343(3) jurisdiction,
while Lynch viewed section 1331 in a'more passive role as to 1343(3)
jurisdiction. Thus, Lynch reconciled the two provisions in a manner
34. Id.
35. Such rights as freedom of religion and freedom of speech are inherently incapable
of pecuniary evaluation.
36. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 529-32 (1939).
37. See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 548 .(1972).
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which permits expansion of section 1343(3) unforeseen when the Hague
principle was first enunciated.
Lynch cannot be viewed in this context alone. Policy questions emerge
as to the tenor and direction of the Court in the field of civil rights
jurisdiction generally, which make a section 1343(3) extension more
understandable. At the present time there are an ever increasing num-
ber of civil rights claims, which by their nature are partially proprietary,
yet cannot meet the ten thousand dollar minimum of section 1331. 3
But for the Lynch decision these claims would have no federal forum
from which to seek redress. The underlying policy which the Supreme
Court seems to be following is that which was first enunciated in
Monroe v. Pape,39 i.e., an expansion of civil rights jurisdiction in gen-
eral. A restrictive reading of 1343(3) jurisdiction would narrow the
number of claims able to reach a federal forum. By including property
claims within the scope of section 1343(3), and thus eliminating the
amount in controversy requirement as to them, the Court remains
consistent with its general policy of Monroe.
There is another interesting line of reasoning in Lynch which merits
reflection. Lynch stated that the Supreme Court never followed a
personal-property distinction as a guide to 1343(3) jurisdiction, except
in cases involving the constitutionality of certain state taxing practices. 40
The Court distinguished these cases from its general rule of the non-
applicability of a personal-property distinction to 1343(3) jurisdiction
by saying that these cases were really governed by the Tax Injunction
Act,4 1 which prevents anticipatory adjudication of such claims in the
federal courts. This Act was originally passed in 1937. Household
Finance cited Carter v. Greenhow42 and Pleasants v. Greenhow43 which
were 1884 cases, and Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co.,44 which was
a 1900 case. The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 could not possibly have
applied to these three cases. Household Finance cited these cases for
the proposition that the Court had used such a guideline as to the scope
38. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1971).
39. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In a section 1983 claim, employing the
jurisdictional correlate section 1343(3), the Court said that the federal forum should be
supplemental to the state forum, and should be available even if no state remedy is avail-
able. This was a broad reading of the scope of section 1343(3).
40. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
42. 114 U.S. 317 (1884).
43. 114 U.S. 323 (1884).
44. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
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of 1343(3) jurisdiction. Therefore, it seems the Court did in fact fail
to properly support its blanket statement that it had "never" invoked
a personal-property distinction.
The Lynch decision is perhaps erroneous in the underlying considera-
tions of the formulation of the Hague distinction. The Court was
perhaps presumptuous in distinguishing Household Finance's precedent
as to a personal-property distinction. But, given the general policy,
seemingly pursued by the Court, on an expanded federal forum for an
expanded segment of the populus in the area of civil rights, Lynch is
indeed understandable.
Larry D. Yogel
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS-PAROLEE'S RIGHT UNDER THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO AN OP-
PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD PRIOR TO REVOKING HIS PAROLE-The United
States Supreme Court has held that a parolee's liberty involves signifi-
cant values within the protection of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and termination of that liberty requires an
informal hearing to give assurance that the finding of a parole viola-
tion is based on verified facts to support the revocation.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Petitioners Morrissey and Booher were each convicted of forgery and
sentenced to a term in an Iowa penitentiary. Over a year later each was
released on parole. Approximately six months after their release, at
their parole officers' discretion, each was arrested for parole violations
and confined in a local jail. At the end of the following week, solely
on the basis of a written report by their parole officers, the Iowa Board
of Parole revoked their parole and the petitioners were returned to the
penitentiary. At no time during any of the proceedings which led to
the parole revocations were the petitioners granted any type of hearing.
After exhausting state remedies, both petitioners filed habeas corpus
petitions in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa alleging that they had been denied due process because their
paroles had been revoked without a hearing. The district court held
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